Biden and his policy towards South America, a region today condemned to irrelevance

South America today occupies a minor place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The region has lost the importance it once had in the past and is unlikely to regain that strategic role in the near future.

Almost 150 days after Joe Biden took office in the U.S., in the face of a convulsed domestic environment, his administration shows that the priority is always on domestic issues. The handling of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the economy were the major urgent issues he had to address. In foreign policy, he sought to reinsert himself in those spaces that his predecessor Donald Trump had left aside while trying to reestablish ties with his traditional allies.

However, the relationship of the new tenant of the White House with the American continent has been, for the moment, scarce. The emphasis has been on Mexico and Central America and focused mainly on the immigration issue. The rest of the region, especially the countries of South America, has been practically absent from his agenda, their current strategic irrelevance being an important part of the explanation.

Strategic value refers to the possession of a certain asset or involvement in a certain situation, which makes a certain country relevant to the interests of a superpower. This fluctuating, intersubjective condition, relative to certain historical moments, influences the margins of maneuver of the weaker countries in their relations with the stronger ones and the level of attention they pay to them.

From this perspective, in the early years of the 21st century, Washington’s perception of several South American countries showed a relative interest in the region. With Venezuela, beyond the political controversies, it had extensive trade relations because it was one of its main sources of hydrocarbons. With Colombia, it maintained a strong political commitment to dismantle the internal conflict that threatened the security of its own civil society. Brazil, for its part, was perceived as having sufficient powers to delegate to it a role of guardian and mediator of disputes in the region.

In addition, social support for various regional governments exhibiting varying shades of anti-U.S. rhetoric in the region was, to say the least, a focus of attention. Visits and statements by high-level officials and trade and investment treaties were evidence that the region, for better or worse, simply could not be neglected.

The scenario today is different. The U.S. has consolidated incipient energy self-sufficiency, in addition to prioritizing other partners in the energy sector. The armed conflict in Colombia, relegated as a threat, is no longer a priority on its agenda. Brazil, for its part, has been shipwrecked for years between political scandals and poor management of the pandemic, relegating, at least for the time being, its eventual capacity for sub-regional leadership. Finally, in political terms, South America presents a diverse and complex mosaic, although characterized in most cases by low levels of social support for governments. The voices that a few years ago shouted vehemently against U.S. imperialism today find fewer ears willing to listen.

For the moment, it can be said that the region not only does not have assets of strategic relevance but also does not represent a threat in terms of security or even an alternative political discourse popular enough to arouse reactions in Washington. Thus, the irrelevance of the region to Biden’s agenda in his first months is logical. Friends, enemies, assets, concerns, and threats are simply in other latitudes. Whether this is positive or negative depending on the interpreter, for the moment we should not expect too much from the new neighbor who, for now, is looking out of his window into other backyards.

Faced with the rise of China and considering that the South American subcontinent is relevant to strengthen its position and its supply of resources, it would not be surprising that in the coming years the U.S. seeks to consolidate relations with its closest geography to dispute areas of influence. In the meantime, however, South America will continue to be condemned to irrelevance. Whether to take advantage of the situation or to deny it is now in other hands.

First published in DEF Online in co-authorship with Bruna Barlaro Rovati